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Summary. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become part of daily life for millions of
users. Users building explicit networks that represent their social relationships and often share
a wealth of personal information to their own benefit. The potential privacy risks of such be-
havior are often underestimated or ignored. The problem is exacerbated by lacking experience
and awareness in users, as well as poorly designed tools for privacy-management on the part
of the OSN. Furthermore, the centralized nature of OSNs makes users dependent and puts
the Service Provider in a position of power. Because Service Providers are not by definition
trusted or trustworthy, their practices need to be taken into account when considering privacy
risks.
This chapter aims to provide insight into privacy in OSNs. First, a classification of different
types of OSNs based on their nature and purpose is made. Next, different types of data con-
tained in OSNs are distinguished. The associated privacy risks in relation to both users and
Service Providers are identified, and finally relevant research areas for privacy-protecting tech-
niques are discussed. Clear mappings are made to reflect typical relations that exist between
OSN type, data type, particular privacy risks and privacy-preserving solutions.
1 Introduction
In recent years, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have attracted many millions of
users worldwide. Even though Social Networks have always been an important part
of daily life, now that more and more people are connected to the Internet, their
online counterparts are fulfilling an increasingly important role. OSNs have also be-
come a hot topic in areas of research ranging from sociology to computer science
and mathematics.
Aside from allowing users to create a network to represent their social ties, many
OSNs facilitate uploading of multimedia content, various ways of communication
and sharing many aspects of daily life with friends. People can stay in touch with
(physically remote) friends, easily share content and experiences and stay up to date
in the comfort of their own home or when on the move.
However, benefits aside, potential threats to user privacy are often underesti-
mated. For example, due to the public nature of many OSNs and the Internet itself,
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content can easily be disclosed to a wider audience than the user intended. Users
often have trouble revoking or deleting information, and information about a user
might even be posted by others without their consent. Privacy in OSNs is a compli-
cated matter and is not always intuitive to users, especially because it is not always
similar to how privacy works in real-life interactions.
Ideally, users should be able to trade some privacy for functionality, without their
information becoming available beyond the scope they intend. For example, a user
of a self-help OSN (e.g. www.patientslikeme.com) would like to meet people with
the same medical condition, but doest not want everyone to know about his ailment.
Even in less extreme cases, the importance of privacy is often underestimated.
In this chapter, we will observe the privacy risks OSN users face, what causes
them and which techniques may help to minimize these risks. To this end, we first
look at OSNs as they currently exist (Section 2), leading to a classification of OSNs
based on their type and purpose, and a classification of data types in OSNs. We then
map these to associated privacy risks in relation to both fellow users and Service
Providers (Section 3), and finally give an overview of existing research into privacy-
enhancing technologies (Section 4). Through tables, the relationships between these
various aspects are mapped, providing a comprehensive overview. In Section 5 con-
clusions are drawn.
2 Classifying Online Social Networks
Let us begin by framing the concept of Online Social Networks, and observe how
OSNs have become as widely used as they are today. This will help us understand
the purpose of OSNs (which forms the basis for our classification), but also help to
illustrate the needs of users, the environment they navigate, and potential threats as
discussed in further sections.
2.1 Definition of an OSN
Boyd and Ellison’s widely used definition [7] captures the key elements of any OSN:
Definition 1. An OSN is a web-based service that allows individuals to:
1. construct a public or semi-public profile within the service,
2. articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection,
3. view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
service.
The terms to describe a connected user include, but are not limited to: ‘friend’
(www.facebook.com and www.myspace.com), ‘professional’ (www.linkedin.com),
‘relative’ (www.geni.com), ‘follower’ (twitter.com), ‘subscriber’ (www.youtube.com).
Typically a connection is bidirectional (symmetric), but this is not always the case.
For example, ‘following’ on Twitter or ‘subscribing’ on Youtube are one-way rela-
tionships.
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2.2 The Rise of Online Social Networks
The first OSN to see the light of day was Sixdegrees in 1997 [14]. SixDegrees al-
lowed users to create profiles, list and message their friends and traverse friends
listings, thus fitting Boyd and Ellision’s definition of an OSN. Even though there
were millions of users, these did not have that many direct friends and SixDegrees
did not offer much functionality besides messaging. The website finally shut down
in 2000 [7].
During this period other websites started adding OSN features to their existing
content, essentially becoming OSNs, with various degrees of success. In the years
that followed, new OSNs started from scratch and began to offer functionality beyond
simply listing and browsing friends. Ryze.com and later www.linkedin.com tailored
to professionals looking to exchange business contacts, while www.friendster.com
focused on dating and finding new friends. Friendster became widely used and ex-
perienced technical (performance and hardware) and social (fake profiles and friend-
ship hoarding) difficulties due to its rapid growth. The technical issues and actions
taken to combat the social difficulties eventually caused many users to seek out other
OSNs. Despite this, Friendster is still popular, particularly in the Phillipines, Indone-
sia and Myanmar [44].
The popularity of Friendster encouraged the creation of other similar “social
OSNs”, like www.myspace.com and www.orkut.com. While Myspace has become
popular among youth worldwide, Google’s Orkut has attracted a predominantly
Brazilian and Indian crowd [44]. Aside from these clearcut “social OSNs”, a wide
variety of niche OSNs have emerged, each catering to a particular interest. Adding
the social structure of an OSN to existing services can often enrich them, making
them more useful and attractive to users, or binding users to providers. Currently,
OSNs form an integral part of the Internet.
As we have seen, not all OSNs are alike: they can serve different uses for dis-
parate target audiences. A clear classification of OSNs can help us to understand
what OSNs mean to their users and how they are used, which in turn will help us to
structure our thoughts on privacy in OSNs.
2.3 Existing Classifications
It is remarkable that hardly any classifications for OSNs exist in scientific literature,
even though OSNs are studied in many disciplines. However, some pseudo-scientific
blogs and marketing resources offer relevant thoughts on the matter, a selection of
which are summarized below.
Classifications by Topical Focus
Lovetoknow.com [17] classifies OSNs based on their topical focus:
• Informational. Seeking answers to everyday problems
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• Professional. Helping you to advance within your career or industry
• Educational. Collaborate with other students or academic projects
• Hobbies. Conduct research on their favorite projects or topics of interest related
to personal hobbies
• Academic. For important collaboration within the scientific community, over the
Internet
• News. Those that publish “community content”
Such a topical point of view seems very relevant, although the categories of Infor-
mational, Educational and Academic seem to have some overlap.
Onlinebrandmanager.com [40] first classifies OSNs into four main areas:
• Dating / friendship
• Alumni networks
• Career / business related
• Hobby / group networks
They then state that these can be further split up into: Book communities, Busi-
ness Networking & Professionals, Family, Friends, Hobbies & Interests, Languages,
Video Sharing, Photo Sharing, Audio Sharing, Mobile Communities, Shopping, So-
cial Bookmarking, Students and Travel & Locals. They note that these are broad
categories, where a specific OSN may fit several categories. We remark that sub-
categories do not always seem logical extensions of the main categories, and their
interrelation is not clearcut. Note however, that many categories are again topical,
while some categories seem to focus on the purpose for which users visit the OSN.
Classifications by Topical Specificity
In contrast, Hudsonhorizons.com [27] uses topical specificity to divide OSNs into
two groups:
• Broad-range. “Some social networking websites, such as Facebook, fall into the
‘general’ category; they accommodate folks of all interests and backgrounds.
On this type of social networking websites, members can often include a list of
their interests, and then locate members with similar interests by searching for
keywords and key phrases. The main purpose of general social networking sites
is to serve as a social platform where people can reunite with old friends, stay
connected with current ones, and even make new acquaintances.
• Niche. “Other social networking sites have tight, niche focuses, and cater to spe-
cific groups of people. Social networking sites can revolve around sports, dating,
culture, hobbies, ethnicity, education, romance, entrepreneurship and more.”
Note that the topic in question, or the goal behind it (dating vs. talking about hobbies
vs. learning) does not play a role in their classification.
The following quote is from Enid Burns on Clickz.com [10], regarding advertis-
ing through OSNs:
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Many of these sites target communities defined by their affinity to a vertical
industry, business model, or interactivity type, unlike Myspace and Youtube,
which are designed to appeal to the mass population.
Again, the broad distinction made here seems to be on topical specificity.
Liz Gannes on Gigaom.com [22] also devotes a blog entry to classifying OSNs.
The following three terms form the core of her argument:
• Blank slates. Gannes names Myspace and Bebo as typical examples. These seem
to be what others might call “broad-range” or “general” OSNs.
• Target audiences. Targeted to a specific niche; Gannes compares them to ad ver-
ticals.
• Existing interests / existing communities. She names last.fm as an example, where
OSN functionality is well-integrated into an existing activity (listening to music).
This category seems to center around integrating OSN functionality into an al-
ready established, successful community.
Gannes also mentions “social tools”: sites that have a certain goal in mind, such
as LinkedIn. She describes the difference between a social network and a social
tool as “a place to hang out for X kind of people” vs. “a place to get X done.”
One of her readers states that OSNs seem to have two main purposes: “communica-
tion” (networking with pre-existing group) and ”self-expression” (social network is
just a feature). Another reader proposes “Community around shared services” (e.g.
Del.icio.us) as a separate category. We note that this echoes concepts from previously
discussed sources: topical specificity (general social OSNs vs. niche OSNs), and the
purpose of an OSN playing a central role.
Classifications by Other Criteria
Bernard Lunn on Readwriteweb.com [34] also divides OSNs into two types, namely
“Open networks” and “Gated communities”. This distinction is centered around trust
– in some communities (they name OSNs for relatives, doctors or models) trust may
be more important than in others, and users will wish to interact in a gated commu-
nity, that shields them from the outside world. Lunn notes that this does not directly
relate to the size of the OSN or its significance to society, although the concept of
gated communities seems related to both Hudsonhorizon’s niche OSNs and restricted
membership OSNs.
Dave Emmett, on his blog [19], looks at the effect an OSN has on users’ personal
networks:
• Tightening. Deepens existing relationships. Examples include Facebook, Dopplr
and Friendfeed.
• Broadening. Adds new connections. Examples include Twitter, Brightkite, Flickr
and Youtube
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One of his readers comments that this seems related to the concepts of “bridging and
bonding” in social sciences theory. The main difference here lies in the audience that
a user intends to reach.
Dominique Cardon on internetactu.net [11] discusses the visibility and interac-
tions of users in OSNs. He discussion on the following categories is freely translated
from French:
• The Screen. People only meet through criterion search, and are otherwise invisi-
ble. Users are matched online and test their compatibility in the real world.
• The Clear-obscure. People share information on their daily private lives, but
mostly to a select audience. These settings are about strengthening pre-existing
relationships or explore friends-of-friends.
• The Lighthouse. People portray their identity, preferences or content with the
general audience. Uses its high visibility to expand beyond real-life friends and
find a larger audience.
• The Post-it. Users show their presences and availability through contextual clues,
but to a restricted circle. The real and virtual worlds are highly interwoven.
• The Magic Lantern. Users employ personalized avatars as pseudonyms to decou-
ple their online and offline identities. Interactions are mostly virtual and rarely
extend into the real world.
Some remarks are made to relate network size, structure, homogeneity and growth to
visibility. Cardon continues to discuss navigation methods, like “criterion referenced
search engine”, “friend network navigation” and “user-activity driven search”. It is
clear that the goal of users in an OSN plays an important role throughout Cardon’s
views.
Finally, Wikipedia [15] offers the following thoughts on OSN classification:
[...]Although online community services are sometimes considered as a
social network service in a broader sense, social network service usually
means an individual-centered service whereas online community services
are group-centered. Social networking sites allow users to share ideas, ac-
tivities, events, and interests within their individual networks.
The main types of social networking services are those which contain cat-
egory places (such as former school-year or classmates), means to connect
with friends (usually within self-description pages) and a recommendation
system linked to trust. Popular methods now combine many of these[...]
One can imagine yet other ways to distinguish between OSNs:
• Source of revenue. The OSN Service Provider can earn his revenue through di-
rect or indirect means (subscriptions or micro-payments versus advertisements
or data sales).
• Membership type. This can be open, select or invitation only.
• Wideness of user base. Does the OSN attract a worldwide, national or regional
audience, or does it target a specific demographic or subculture.
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2.4 New Classification of OSNs Based on Purpose
Recall that our classification is intended to structure our thoughts on privacy in OSNs.
We feel that the purpose that an OSN fulfills to its user base is the main factor to de-
termine the functionalities it offers, which in turn dictates what sort of data exists
in the network, and how users can interact – this data and user interaction are what
privacy is all about. Therefore, our approach may come to resemble those of [40] and
[17] most, although we feel that none of the above classifications provide complete-
ness, non-overlapping categories or a true focus on purpose.
For each category, some illustrative examples will be provided. We make our first
broad distinction between OSNs that focus on connections and those that focus on
content.
Connection OSNs
Connection OSNs focus on the social connections and interactions between users,
by providing users with a social contact list, channels for interaction or matching
services. Their general purpose is usually to connect users to new or existing friends
and acquaintances, or to provide an easy way to maintain such relationships.
Dating. Dating sites are websites that aim to help users to find the love of their
life – many dating sites incorporate OSN aspects these days. Each user has lo-
gin credentials and usually a profile to attract potential lovers. Connections are
typically in the form of love interests, but friendship links are also common;
user groups may also exist. Traversing the OSN is often based on browsing,
searching or recommendation generation, rather than through navigating ex-
isting connections. Messages exchanged between users are often kept private
to these users, although in some cases comment sections viewable by others
are offered. Behavioral information can be kept by the OSN to provide better
recommendations. Example dating sites are www.match.com, www.paiq.nl and
www.plentyoffish.com.
Business. These OSNs aim to provide professionals with useful business contacts.
Searching for profiles does not always require signing up. Profiles display users’
capabilities and work field as well as a means to contact them. This is usually
done through the OSN via personal messaging. Users can also add other users
to their network of connections so that other professionals can see who the user
is working or has contact with. An example of this class is www.linkedin.com,
which requires a subscription for premium services.
Enforcing real-life relationships. These OSNs are not aimed at finding new friends,
but (re)connecting users with existing friends or acquaintances. Examples in-
clude family-oriented OSNs, college or ex-classmate focused networks, such as
www.mylife.com, www.odnoklassniki.ru and www.plaxo.com.
Socializing. Fitting the more traditional view of social networks, what others might
call a “blank slate” or “broad-range network”. Here users can connect with cur-
rent friends and find new ones. Most types of information can be found in OSNs
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of this class; often a lot of this information is (semi-)public. The revenue for
the OSN Service Provider often comes from advertisements and selling infor-
mation about the OSN, but can sometimes be combined with a subscription for
additional functionalities (as with www.hyves.nl for example). In order to at-
tract new users and bind them, this type of OSN usually has a lot of additional
functionalities such as social and competitive games. For a user the value of a
social OSN is often largely determined by the number of friends that use that par-
ticular OSN. Some well known examples of this class are www.facebook.com,
www.orkut.com and www.myspace.com.
Chat / Instant Messaging. Some (webcam-)chat websites (e.g. www.stickam.com)
contain OSN features (friends list and profile). Some sources consider Instant
Messaging (IM) services an OSN, if they allow users to store an explicit “ad-
dress book” of friends. Popular IM clients include Windows Live Messenger
(formerly MSN Messenger), AOL Instant Messenger (AIM), ICQ, Skype and
Yahoo! Messenger.
Content OSNs
Content OSNs focus more on content provided by, or linked to by users. This con-
tent can be multi-media or information like knowledge, advice or news. The social
interactions with other users usually revolve around and are driven by a search for
information or the exchanging of said media.
Content sharing. Sharing of user-generated content can happen within a selected
group, such as friends or family, or a far wider audience. Content that is shared
is usually multi-media; this is often of potential interest to a wide audience, and
even for selected audiences, e-mailing such content is cumbersome and often
impossible due to size of the data. Uploading content generally requires users to
sign up and log in; sometimes viewing content also requires logging in, or view-
ing is restricted through the use of hard-to-guess obfuscated URLs. Sometimes
messages or tags can be added to the shared content, and especially in more
open systems content tagging and recommendation may be an integral part of
the system. User profiles, if any, are usually brief. Examples are Picasa (picas-
aweb.google.com), photobucket.com and www.youtube.com.
Resource recommendation. In some OSNs users do not focus on uploading content,
but on recommending existing (usually professional, external) content or re-
sources. Book-review sites like weread.com and URL-tagging communities like
delicious.com are prime examples where external items are discovered, added to
the system as links and finally tagged or rated. No actual content is created or
uploaded.
Advice sharing. Offering a place for people to share their experience or expertise
in a certain area with others, or to seek help and advice can be a focus for
some OSNs. For example mothers-to-be (www.babycenter.com), medical pa-
tients (www.patientslikeme.com) or students (www.teachstreet.com) can help
one another. Other examples include www.advogato.org for software develop-
ers, the now discontinued Cake Financial [13] and sciencestage.com.
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Hobbies / Entertainment. Many OSNs focus on audiences that have similar inter-
ests and hobbies. Such OSNs may involve multi-media uploads, recommen-
dation or advice sharing elements, but the main distinguishing feature is their
homogeneous audience. This means that the topic of the OSN mainly deter-
mines its character and appeal for users. Examples are www.athlinks.com for
athletes, www.care2.com for those interested in health and green living, or OSNs
tied to gaming communities like Xbox Live (www.xbox.com/en-us/live/) or
www.playfire.com. Entertainment OSNs might make money through advertise-
ments or direct sales targeted to their user base’s niche, or through subscriptions.
“News” sharing. Some OSNs focus on world news or gossip, but a multitude of
(micro-)blogging OSNs provide a stage mainly for sharing “personal news”,
opinions and experiences. Examples are www.nowpublic.com, www.blogster.com,
twitter.com, www.buurtlink.nl and www.gossipreport.com.
2.5 Data in OSNs
Now that we have an idea of the wide variety of OSNs and their purpose, let us take
a look at the data that these systems can contain. From Boyd and Ellison’s definition,
we can already deduce that the following user-related data must exist in an OSN:
Profiles. A profile is tied to a user and is their representation to the outside world.
Usually this is a self description, or the description of an alter-ego (pseudonym,
avatar). This may typically include a short biography, a picture and attributes
like age, gender, location and the like.
Connections. A connection exists between two users and can be of several types,
like friend, colleague, fan, etc. A collection of connections can be represented
by a graph.
Login credentials. Most OSNs require the user to login to make use of the service. A
user account ties a profile to the user behind it, and to sign in the user needs cer-
tain login credentials. Such credentials can also be found in traditional websites,
and this chapter will not pay special attention to the security issues surrounding
them.
Depending on the goal of an OSN and the additional services it offers, other forms
of information related to users can be involved:
Messages. We view messages in the broadest sense of the word. Any piece of data
exchanged between a user and another user or a group of users is a message;
these may contain text or multi-media. Messages form the basis for additional
OSN functionalities. Interaction between users has been recognized as a rich
source of information on the underlying social network, even more so than
friendship graphs [51]. Note that in some cases a message can be instantaneous
and short-lived, as in an Instant Messaging setting. In other cases messages may
be stored for an indefinite time and be read long after being sent; think of blog
posts or messages left on a user’s “Wall” on Facebook. Note that in some cases
the Service Provider stores messages, in others fellow users do (as with most
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Instant Messaging applications). The sender of these messages often has little
control of how long the messages are stored.
Multi-media. Actual content that can be attached to messages, but may also be up-
loaded to private or public data-spaces (e.g. Picasa photo album, a blog, Face-
book “Wall”) or be attached to a profile. Examples are contents of blog entries
(text, photos, video), or the photos, video, music and voice recordings that can
be connected to a Myspace or Stickam profile.
Groups. A group is a collection of users, who usually share some common attributes,
resources or privileges, for example: similar preferences or backgrounds, a col-
laborative document, or access to a common virtual space.
Tags. We define tags in the broad sense, as in collaborative filtering systems: de-
scriptive keywords (meta-data) that are attached to content by users (either the
uploader or other users). In Facebook terminology, ‘tagging’ refers to the spe-
cific case where a user identifies the people depicted in a photo by tags the photo
with their names, thus explicitly linking these people to the picture.
Preferences / Ratings / Interests. Many OSNs provide their users with some type of
matching or recommendation functionality for either content or peers. In or-
der to provide relevant recommendations, information on a user’s attributes or
preferences is required. Often, users are asked to explicitly express their prefer-
ences or rate items. The resulting information may be publicly visible (interests
on a profile page, ratings for an item shows along with who provided them) or
restricted to the Service Provider only. Sometimes, the Service Provider will de-
rive (supplementary) information on users’ preferences and attributes from their
behavioral information.
Behavioral information. By this we mean browsing history, profile settings, and any
actions undertaken by the user while performing tasks within the OSN. Ben-
evenuto et al. note that this type of meta-data is particularly rich [5]. Information
such as preferences, friendships or even attributes such as physical location or
demographic data can be inferred from it. Behavioral data is also found in tra-
ditional websites, although behavior there is not related to navigating a social
network.
As said, not all OSNs involve information from all of the above categories. Which
information is contained in a particular OSN mostly depends on its media-richness,
the functionality it offers to users, and its business model. Some information is only
available to the Service Provider (i.e. the OSNs software or operators), while other
information is also available to (a subset of) the OSN users, or even the public at
large.
Furthermore, some information is consciously supplied by users through the
OSN’s graphical user interface, while other information is implicitly derived by the
Service Provider by observing user behavior.
2.6 Summary
People use OSNs for a variety of purposes. In any case, to get the desired function-
ality (e.g. meeting with friends, attracting an audience, getting advice or recommen-
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dations), they will need to provide some personal information to the OSN. The type
of user data in question depends on the functionality of the OSN, and its media-
richness. Table 1 gives an impression of which data types may typically be expected
in different types of OSNs. In tables,  represents a likely match, • represents a
possible match and · an unlikely match.
Table 1. Data types typically found in different types of OSNs.
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Connection OSNs
Dating  •  • ·  •  
Business    • · •   
Enforcing real-life relationships    • · •   
Socializing    • · •   
Chat / instant messaging •   • · •   
Content OSNs
Content sharing • •    • •  
Resource recommendation  · •    •  
Advice sharing  •  • • •   
Hobbies / entertainment • •  • • •   
“News” sharing • •   • • •  
3 Privacy Concerns in Online Social Networks
Because users need to reveal information to make use of the desired functionality of
an OSN, there exists a tradeoff between functionality and user privacy. Making sure
the OSN can provide the desired functionality is one thing, but when sharing a wealth
of (personal) data, one should also consider what undesired results might occur. We
have seen examples where data is potentially sensitive (e.g. medical or dating OSNs),
and the open nature of online systems makes privacy a definite issue. In this section,
we will look into the concept of privacy, its role in OSNs, and potential threats to
users’ privacy.
3.1 Definitions Regarding Privacy
The word privacy has many subtly different meanings, each with their own definition.
This ranges from “personal privacy” (which involves seclusion and bodily privacy)
to “Information Privacy”, around which privacy on the Internet in general revolves.
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Kang [29] uses the wording of the Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), as
cited below:
Information Privacy is “an individual’s claim to control the terms under
which personal information–information identifiable to the individual – is
acquired, disclosed or used.”
This concept of Information Privacy is strongly related to the notion of “Confi-
dentiality”, from the field of Information Security, but not to be used interchange-
ably. Confidentiality is concerned with the secrecy or disclosure of individual pieces
of information, while Information Privacy also deals with the individual who is the
subject of said information, the effects that disclosure have on this person and his or
her control and consent.
When users collaborate in a Web2.0 setting, they generally share a lot of (per-
sonal) information. When users upload their data to an OSN, they usually have a
scope in mind (as a quote from Palen and Dourish’ below illustrates). Privacy in-
volves keeping a piece of information in its intended scope. This scope is defined by
the size of the audience (breadth), by extent of usage allowed (depth), and duration
(lifetime). When a piece of information is moved beyond its intended scope in any
of these dimensions (be it accidentally or maliciously), a privacy breach occurs. So,
a breach may occur when information is shared with a party for whom it was not
intended (disclosure), when information is abused for a different purpose than was
intended, or when information is accessed after its intended lifetime. We also see this
reflected in data protection laws, such as the Data Protection Act 1998 in the United
Kingdom [43], where the use of personal data is not regulated in an all-or-nothing
fashion, but limitations are imposed on the extent and duration of its use.
Palen and Dourish [42] identify three privacy boundaries with which individuals
are struggling:
1. The disclosure boundary (managing the tension between private and public),
2. The identity boundary (managing self representation with specific audience, e.g.
one will behave differently when at work than when among friends),
3. The temporal boundary (managing past actions with future expectations; user
behavior may change over time).
Something to note at this stage, is that by no means all information that is up-
loaded to an OSN is considered personal data, and is thus not covered by laws regu-
lating the use of personal data. Personal data is defined in [43] as:
Personal data means data which relate to a living individual who can be
identified –
(a) from those data, or
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or
is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller
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The term Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is related (but not synony-
mous), and refers to “information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or
locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single
individual”.
Particularly sensitive personaly information is often regulated by additional laws,
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for medical
data, or sensitive personal data under Data Protection Act 1998, the definition of
which includes:
The racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, his political opinions, his reli-
gious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, [...] his physical or mental
health or condition, his sexual life, the commission or alleged commission
by him of any offense [...]
However, the majority of data in an OSN does not clearly fall under these cate-
gories, and its storage, processing and use is not always strictly regulated.
3.2 Users and Privacy Management
Weiss [53] states that on the traditional Web, privacy is maintained by limiting data
collection, hiding users’ identities and restricting access to authorized parties only,
while the reality of OSNs is that data and identity become closely linked, and are
often visible to large groups of people. It becomes harder for a user to monitor and
control his personal information, as more of it becomes available online. Together,
this makes managing information and privacy a lot more difficult.
Most OSNs offer their users privacy controls that are simple to use, but coarse,
for example enabling users to set their entire profile as public, visible to friends only
or private (visible only to the user). With growing demand from users and increased
attention to privacy in the media, many OSNs (e.g. Facebook) have started offering
their users more (apparent) control, like setting the visibility for individual items, or
allowing users to organize their friends into categories. Another risk lies in the other
extreme, when interfaces become overly complicated. If users do not understand the
settings or find them too cumbersome, they may either set them incorrectly or ignore
them and settle for sub-optimal privacy protection.
Gross and Acquisti [24] show in a case study that most users do not change the
default privacy settings as provided by the OSN, while sharing a large amount of
information on their profile. Tufecki [49] concludes in his case study that privacy-
aware users are actually more reluctant to join social networks, but once they do join,
they still disclose a lot of information. Another observation is that users’ privacy
is regulated mostly through visibility, i.e. the privacy settings of the OSN, rather
than through selective uploading. In general users are pre-occupied with the current
visibility of their information and do not take into account future change and its
implications. It seems that users implicitly trust OSN Service Providers to handle
user data in a fair and conscientious way, and continue to do so in the future.
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3.3 Service Providers and Trust
Besides difficulties in managing privacy towards other “users” (registered or not),
there exists a completely different type of concern, originating from the user’s rela-
tionship with the OSN Service Provider. The main difference between users and the
Service Provider is the type of information they can access. A user or outsider can
generally only view public information. The Service Provider can generally view all
data in the system, including private uploads, browsing behavior, IP addresses, etc.
It is also the Service Provider who decides which data is stored, how long it is kept
and how it is used or distributed. The user is also dependent on the Service Provider
for tools to protect his privacy. Therefore, trust plays a big role in the relationship
between a user and the Service Provider.
On a related note, the rules with regards to ownership and intellectual property of
user-uploaded data can be deceptive. Some OSNs (for example Facebook) acquire a
license to use such content through their terms-of-use policy. This license gives the
OSN free reign to use or sell the data as it sees fit, without worrying about copyrights
or other claims by the user. Facebook’s statement of rights and responsibilities [20]
states:
You own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, and you
can control how it is shared through your privacy and application settings.
In addition:
For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos
and videos (“IP content”), you specifically give us the following permis-
sion, subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-
exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to
use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (“IP
License”). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not
deleted it. [...]
This becomes unnerving once we realize that the interests of users and Service
Provider can clash, especially in OSNs where the main source of revenue is not
the users, but third party sales and targeted advertisement.
Finally, we note that many laws, including the Data Protection Act 1998 [43],
focus on “data controllers”. There are no specific regulations for OSNs and they are
currently treated as “information services” – online databases of information. The
EU article 29 Data Protection Working Party [50] would like to see this changed, so
that OSN Service Providers will be treated as “data controllers”, which will obligate
them to adhere to laws for processing of user data. This should it easier to guarantee
the trustworthiness of OSNs, by forcing them to be more privacy-friendly, ideally
without hampering the services they offer to their users.
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3.4 User-related Privacy Concerns
In many cases, privacy is breached by fellow OSN users, or unregistered visitors.
This may be a deliberate act (snooping, hacking), or accidental (mismanagement
of privacy settings by the user himself, lingering data), and can have serious conse-
quences. Let us take a look at different privacy threats that involve disclosure to other
users.
Stranger Views Private Information. Users can falsely assume some information to
be kept restricted to a certain audience, when in reality it is not. This can be
due to design flaws on the part of the OSN Service Provider (e.g. private photos,
videos and blogs being easily “hacked” on Myspace [28]), or a lack of under-
standing or attention to the privacy controls of the user himself. However, even
Internet security experts can make mistakes with disclosing information [54].
When a stranger views such private information, user control over who views
the information is lost and conflict occurs with the disclosure boundary. The
above can apply to profiles, connections to fellow users, messages, multi-media,
tags, group memberships etc. Rosenblum [46] shows that information in OSNs
is far more accessible to a widespread audience than perceived by its owners,
and can even end up in the mainstream media [26].
Unable to Hide Information from a Specific Friend or Group. Sometimes one would
like to hide some information from a specific friend or a group of friends. Per-
haps a user would not like to let a friend know that a surprise party is being
planned or hide the pictures of a night out from his parents or employer. In real
life, we easily manage the different social contexts that we belong to, but in
OSN’s the lines that separate them tend to blur [31]. Not many OSNs provide
the option to create groups of friends for different social contexts or hide infor-
mation on a fine-grained level. This problem is related to Palen and Dourish’
identity boundary as users do not have the control to act differently towards one
user or group of users, than towards others.
Other Users Posting Information About You. Even if a user is careful in controlling
what information she posts to an OSN, she has no control over what other users
post in the same OSN. Often, messages contain information about multiple OSN
users, or even non-users. This problem is related to the disclosure boundary,
because information is made more public than intended, in this case by others. It
can occur when another user posts information about you which you do not want
to be uploaded to the OSN, or when information disclosed privately to another
user is made available to a larger audience. This can even be a deliberate act [45].
3.5 Provider-related Privacy Concerns
A completely different type of privacy threat involves the relationship between the
user and OSN Service Provider, and in particular the trust that the user puts in the
provider. This goes beyond user control of information, because the Service Provider
usually designed or configured the systems underlying the OSN. Thus, he has full
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access to any user-related data, including browsing behavior and message logs. The
associated threats are detailed below.
Data Retention Issues. When posting information to an OSN it is often impossible
or very difficult to remove that information, for several reasons. On one hand,
the Service Provider may intentionally prevent or hinder removal of data. Face-
book for example does not provide users with the means to delete their profile,
and has actively blocked third-party software that attempts to remedy this [35].
This is because the capital of an OSN often lies in the number of users, and
data sales are sometimes part of the revenue. Facebook would like to store con-
tent forever [52]. Secondly, information (especially in a social context) tends to
be replicated. People may spread information or multi-media and even store it
locally and re-upload it at a later time. Finally, information that is apparently
erased may still reside elsewhere on the OSN, for example in backups, to be
found by others. Similarly, a resource may be disabled or seemingly deleted, but
references to it (thumbnails, messages on friends’ pages etc.) can remain visible
to the outside world. An example of this is given by Bonneau [6] who tracked the
availability of deleted photos. These are all violations of the temporal boundary
as information is available longer than intended.
OSN Employee Browsing Private Information. The OSN Service Provider has full
access to the data and its employees might take advantage of this. This is in
conflict with the implicit trust that the OSN asks of its users. All information
supplied to the OSN is at risk in this issue, up to and including behavioral infor-
mation. Interviews suggest that some Facebook employees are able to view user
information and it is left to the company to police this [39].
Selling of Data. The wealth of information that is stored on the OSN, is likely to be
of value to third parties and may be sold by the OSN. User preferences, behavior
and friendship connections are all potentially interesting for marketing purposes
and research into social dynamics. Data sales can easily be in conflict with the
implicit trust the user has in the OSN. Depending on the OSN’s business model,
it may be in the interest of the OSN to have its users share as much information
as possible, to obtain a license or ownership wherever possible, to store it indefi-
nitely and get maximal profits from sales. One example of an OSN that provides
user data to third parties is PatientsLikeMe. To quote their website:
PatientsLikeMe offers pharmaceutical companies the opportunity to
reach and learn from thousands of patients with chronic diseases. Follow
their symptoms, treatments, outcomes and attitudes. Evaluate real-world
safety and efficacy data, and conduct targeted clinical trial recruitment.
These are just a few examples of how our portfolio of services drives
value at each stage of the drug development process.
Even though data is often anonymized before being sold to protect user pri-
vacy, re-identification is a remaining threat that is often overlooked or ignored.
Backstrom et al. [3] show how users can be re-identified by looking for unusual
points within the friendship graph of the actual OSN, and locating these in the
anonymized dataset.
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Targeted Marketing. Multiple pieces of information in the OSN can be combined to
provide a high value profile of the user. This high value profile can then be used
or exploited to present targeted marketing to the user. This again is a conflict of
the implicit trust in the OSN, because information is used for a different purpose
than intended by the user. An example of a company which uses OSN data for
targeted marketing is TrustFuse [38].
“All of this information could come in handy for Rapleaf’s third busi-
ness, TrustFuse, which sells data (but not e-mail addresses) to marketers
so they can better target customers, according to TrustFuse’s Web site”
3.6 Summary
Because OSNs contain massive amounts of useful and interesting data about large
numbers of users, they form an interesting target for third parties, both private and
commercial. Either through browsing/spidering, hacking attacks or legitimate data-
sales, this information could end up in the wrong hands. The fact that the users are not
always the source of revenue for an OSN (in the case of advertisement revenue and
data sales) can lead to conflicting interests for users and Service Providers. Given
the diverse and often extensive information available on OSNs, and the fact that
threats may come from other users or even the Service Provider itself, the threats are
numerous. Table 2 attempts to give a comprehensive overview. In this table concern
is high (), medium (•), or low (·).
Table 2. Privacy concerns for user data in OSNs.
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4 Existing Research into Privacy-Protecting Technologies
We have seen that there is a wide variety of privacy issues that play a role in OSNs.
Because the type of access differs greatly between users and Service Providers, the
two main categories of threats require their own specific defense mechanisms. De-
spite the fact that prevention is no simple matter, research is being conducted in
many areas to alleviate some of the aforementioned threats. To protect user data
from fellow users, awareness and proper tools for managing and enforcing access
policies play a leading role [2, 12, 31]. This does not work towards solving issues
that involve untrusted Service Providers. Obscuring and hiding sensitive data from
the providers [1, 25, 48], or removing them from the picture entirely [8, 9, 47] are
the general approaches here, as we will see. We now proceed to a topical literature
overview of research on mitigating privacy issues and tailoring to the privacy needs
of users.
4.1 Anonymization
As pointed out in Sections 2 and 3.5, sales of information pertaining to the OSN
is often a major source of revenue for the Service Provider. If this were to be done
without any further consideration for privacy, users might take offense and leave the
network (thus hurting revenue), or take justified legal action. Through anonymiza-
tion, OSN Service Providers may try to remove the privacy issues associated with
data sales, by obscuring the link between users and data sold.
Basic anonymization involves removing any identifying (or identifiable) infor-
mation from the data, while preserving other structures of interest in the data. As said
however, different re-identification attacks [3] can be mounted to fill in the missing
info from the data sold, e.g. by exploiting the topology of the network. Techniques
for more thorough anonymization have been proposed, for example mixing of at-
tributes, or modifying the graph structure in such a way that its properties stay mainly
intact, while making re-identification hard or impossible [55]. Zhou et al. [56] give a
good overview of this field and its problems. Recently the field of anonymization is
shifting towards differential privacy [18], which aims to make users in released data
computationally indistinguishable from most of the other users in that data set.
Anonymization techniques are usually simple to implement, and need to be per-
formed only once on a given snapshot of the OSN before sales to third parties. The
drawback is that it is hard to formally prove the security of these methods, as is
done in classical cryptography. This mainly stems from the fact that information can
only be partially removed or obfuscated, while other parts must be kept intact for
the dataset to remain interesting for after-sale use. Because OSNs are such complex
systems, it is nearly impossible to predict which pieces of data can be combined into
identifiable information, or which external hints may become available for attackers
to exploit. This is what makes it hard to definitively prevent (partial) recovery of the
private information that was obscured through anonymization.
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4.2 Decentralization
Research on decentralization of OSNs revolves around the concept of untrusted OSN
Service Providers, and tries to prevent privacy issues where the implicit trust in the
OSN is abused. Decentralization can be applied to different degrees. Either some
of the power is taken away from the Service Provider, or he is removed from the
picture altogether. An example with slight decentralization would be to set up direct
links between users when chatting. In this way the chat data never passes through the
server. An extreme form of decentralization would remove the OSN altogether and
have all traffic take place through peer-to-peer networks. Generally the more decen-
tralized the solution the better the protection from aforementioned privacy issues.
Buchegger and Datta [8] list the possible advantages and challenges for shifting
to a fully decentralized OSN. One of the major obstacles is that all users will be
made responsible for availability (and integrity) of (one another’s) information. Be-
cause users cannot be expected to remain online constantly, peers or a trusted proxy
should keep data available on a user’s behalf. Doing this securely (with untrusted
peers), reliably and efficiently poses a big challenge, especially because another of
the main challenges in this area of research lies in version control. Given the churn
of users and the rate at which data is updated, designing a fully decentralized OSNs
is no simple task. Because a decentralized structure works strongly towards taking
power away from the OSN Service Provider, it is contrary to the business model of
many existing OSNs. This means that these will not be likely to adopt such a struc-
ture, or aid its development.
Some creative proposals have been made with the aim to overcome these chal-
lenges. Tootoonchian et al. [48] propose to decouple social relationships from the
user data. User data (which they call “social data”) will still reside on the OSN’s
server, but the relationships (the actual graph) will be in the form of attestations. An
attestation can prove to a Service Provider that two users have a social relationship.
These attestation can then be used for access control, granting the user access to the
proper resources on any such OSN without requiring the user to sign up for every
social network.
Freedman and Nicolosi [21] propose a method for verifying social proximity
(friend of a friend) and give the list of bridging friends to one of the parties. In this
scheme one of the parties looks forward, while the other looks backwards. With both
using a one-way transform, one party compares these relationships. In this directional
scheme, the party that is the target of the friend relationship has to consent. This
party also has to give up more of his privacy, he sends out a key and receives an
attestation. Considering that this party is not the initiator of the relationship this is a
skewed trade-off.
Mezzour et al. [37] propose another method which works for longer paths. This
method works by using a token flooding phase in which tokens are spread throughout
the social graph. The user whom first sent these tokens can use a look-up to discover
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the path between him and the other user. However, revoking any of the relationships
in the flooded path would require another flooding phase.
4.3 Privacy Settings and Management
The research in this field is devoted to finding methods to either give the user more
control over their privacy settings, or make it easier for the user to manage such
settings. In doing so, research in this area hopes to mitigate such problems as unau-
thorized data access by other users and the inability of users to hide information from
a specific friend or group.
Some propose forms of automated assistance to set defaults or adjust privacy
settings. Baatarjav et al. [2] propose a system that selects privacy settings according
to some basic profile information. This profile information is used to predict a set
of expected user preferences, based on statistical data. For example, if most single
elderly ladies adopt a certain set of settings, this will be the default for new users in
this demographic.
A similar approach is suggested by Maximilien et al. [36], where a privacy score
based on the sensitivity and visibility of profile items is computed. This privacy score
can then be compared among peers, and the privacy settings of peers can be mim-
icked if needed.
Goecks et al. [23] have created an overview of the challenges and problems of
configuring privacy settings based on this type of collaboration. Most notable is in-
formation cascade, which is a snowball effect that can lead to the adoption of a
certain set of privacy settings by many users. Because this process can also increase
the score of an unwanted configuration, this herding behavior can eventually lead all
users to share the same unwanted setting. In an extension of their system, Goecks et
al. add an “expert set” of advanced users that has higher priority over regular users.
A different suggestion comes from Banks and Wu [4], where an interaction his-
tory facilitates privacy settings between users, using trust as a currency. This proposal
has not been worked out in detail.
Another interesting research topic is the development of solutions to make in-
formation disclosure and privacy settings more gradual,fine-grained and transparent.
The central question here is how to design appropriate tools for such fine-grained
control, without overburdening the users or the system.
Privacy awareness among users can be enhanced by showing the user the conse-
quences of his actions. According to Lipford et al. [32] this can be done by showing
the user their profile as seen by others. Onwuasonanya et al. [41] study the behavior
of users when given the ability to define subgroups among their online friends. An ex-
isting system that combines both of these features (and other privacy tools) is Clique
(clique.primelife.eu), part of the Primelife project. This experimental OSN allows its
users to create multiple “faces” to use in different social contexts. Each face has its
own collections of contacts (e.g. friends, colleagues and family) and each piece of
information can be made visible to any combination of people [31]. Users can check
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if the desired result is achieved by viewing their profile from the perspective of other
users.
This type of solution is often comparatively cheap to implement, and mainly
depend on OSN Service Providers making the right design choices. However, they
require user awareness and acceptance in order to reach their full potential. Also, data
collection and retention are key to many OSNs’ revenue, so acceptance by Service
Providers may be an even bigger issue.
4.4 Encryption
Encryption can be used as a tool to provide confidentiality and as the basis for in-
tegrity. Depending on how encryption is applied this can mean protection from unau-
thorized users or the Service Provider. It is often used as a building block in other
proposals, for example in decentralized systems or in privacy settings and manage-
ment tools.
Lucas and Borisov [33] propose to encrypt certain parts of a user’s profile using
public key cryptography. Keys are derived from user-supplied passwords in order to
maintain access flexibility. A potential problem with this approach is the resulting
low entropy of the keys.
Guha et al. [25] argue that encrypted messages on a profile are easy to spot by
the Service Provider, which could result in sanctions if the provider disapproves of
encryption. Their aim is akin to steganography, in that the Service Provider should
not even be aware that information hiding is being applied. Their approach uses sub-
stitution of “information atoms” (e.g. age, or name-and-gender) to hide information.
Keys and related material are exchanged out of band. The number of channels that
are used for this scheme is high. Also, users that do not employ this system have
no way to distinguish users that are hiding their information from users that are not.
This makes profiles meaningless to such users, and could lead to cases of mistaken
identity.
The advantage of cryptographic approaches is that they can solve many issues,
if used properly. Through cryptography, one can protect data from other users, as
well as the OSN. In addition, the security of such techniques can often be proven or
verified comparatively easily. However, key management is a big issue, especially if
there is a high amount of churn in friendship relations and group membership. Also,
cryptography often involves expensive operations, for the user, the Service Provider,
or both. Especially in large OSNs, scalability can easily become an obstacle.
4.5 Awareness, Law and Regulations
Research in this mainly non-technical field aims to enhance user awareness of the
privacy issues that exist within OSNs, as well as compliance of both users and Ser-
vice Providers to established laws and social conducts. It can aid users in specifying
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and respecting privacy boundaries, and may alleviate issues like snooping and “other
users posting information about you”.
Kang and Kagal [30] propose a social mechanism to prevent data abuse by show-
ing on a profile what is acceptable to do with the data and what is not. This relies on
proper social conduct and no further technical support is provided to enforce it.
Onwuasoanya et el. [41] want to make it a requirement for the user to group his
friends and consequently be able to set different privacy settings for each group. The
aim is to provide users a simple and intuitive way to manage their privacy settings,
thus increasing user awareness and control.
The system that Goecks et al. [23] propose, uses social collaboration to make it
easier for users to set their privacy settings and make them more aware if their choice
is different from the norm.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [16] is an initiative that aims to pro-
vide websites with a standardized format in which they can define their privacy pol-
icy. Visitors of the website can then, through client-side “user agents” (e.g. plug-ins
for their webbrowser or applets), easily check the details of a privacy policy and see
what will happen to data they submit. This system can help to increase user aware-
ness, but only for users that employ agents and if websites properly define their
privacy policies and adhere to them.
These non-technical approaches lack the power to actively enforce the changes
they propose. Policies and regulations are not mandatory, and awareness is some-
thing that needs time to be raised. Specific laws dealing with personal information as
related to the Internet and OSNs form an important and much needed tool, but often
take long to be developed. Also, laws are generally used to solve matters after things
go wrong, whereas most technical solutions attempt to prevent violations.
4.6 Summary
Table 3 shows which research discipline can contribute to address which privacy
concern: a  indicates that the technique is helpful to address a particular concern,
while a · states that the technique does not seem applicable. None of the disciplines
mentioned in this section offer complete privacy for OSN users. Because the issue of
privacy is multi-faceted, it will require a multi-faceted solution. Several techniques
will likely need to be combined to develop proper technical solutions to tackle the
various privacy issues. In addition, Service Providers should be encouraged or re-
quired to implement such solutions, and users need to be made aware of the benefits
of using them.
5 Conclusion
We have seen that OSNs are used by millions for a wide variety of purposes. In our
classification, we chose to make the broadest distinction between content OSNs and
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Table 3. Privacy concerns and relevant defenses.
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connection OSNs. Users generally either look to share media and information, or
simply socialize. The purpose of an OSN and its media-richness dictate which types
of user data reside in the network. For privacy in turn, this implies which data may
be at risk, and in what ways.
Because OSNs are such complex systems, the privacy issues are myriad. The
fact that trust in the OSNs Service Provider is not always justified further compli-
cates matters. Users are expected to protect their privacy with tools that are designed
by a party that does not by definition have the same goals with regards to privacy,
and even if they are protected from other users, the Service Provider could abuse his
position of power.
Many areas of research can help to protect user privacy, ranging from techni-
cal (e.g. system design and cryptography) to non-technical (e.g. sociology and law).
However, privacy protection should ideally be built into the system, without harming
its operation by overburdening users or Service Provider, or hampering the OSNs
functionalities. Also, we must realize that “The Privacy Problem” – if one could
even formulate it as a single problem – will not be solved by any single research dis-
cipline. Our conclusion is, that in order to develop a full solution to protect consumer
privacy, the strengths of several research areas will need to be brought together. Only
thus can users be educated and empowered, will OSN Service Providers be forced to
comply, and are legal steps possible when prevention fails.
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